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1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter
is pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2A-2(i) (1953 as amended).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Child support and alimony proceedings are equitable in nature
and are not to be disturbed unless the Trial Court abused its
discretion.

Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Ut. 1985) .

This is a different standard than Plaintiff is citing.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUES ON REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS APPELLANT BRIEF
1.

Was Plaintiff's Trial Court Motion to Alter or Amend the

Trial Court's ruling regarding child support a Rule 59 Motion of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore barred by the
Appellate Court Decision dated February 7, 1994, which limited
Plaintiff's Appeal to issues solely under Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure?
2.

If Plaintiff's Motion could be categorized as one under

Rule 60(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, did the Trial Court
abuse its discretion when it calculated child support based on a
Sole Custody Worksheet where Plaintiff failed to prove at the Trial
Court that this was a joint physical custody situation or that he
had contributed to the child's needs beyond regular child support,
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where Defendant was awarded no alimony, and where Plaintiff was
merely granted extended visitation?

ISSUES ON CROSS APPEAL
1.

Did the Trial Court err in refusing to award Defendant

alimony for at least two (2) years or even temporary alimony up to
the date of the Divorce where this is a six (6) year marriage and
where the Plaintiff's income exceeded the Defendant's income by
more that $1,000.00 per month, and the evidence indicated that
Defendant

had

specific

need of alimony and the Plaintiff

had

available income to pay alimony to Defendant?
2.

Did the Trial Court err in dividing the parties' savings

account based on the value at the date of separation rather than
the date of divorce, where it considered Plaintiff's premarital
savings when those savings had been gifted and co-mingled into the
marriage, and where the Trial Court gave Plaintiff a full credit
for the $3,000.00 pre-marital savings when in fact Plaintiff had
already received one-half (M) of his premarital savings back?
3.

Did the Trial Court err in only awarding Defendant a lump

sum of $1,500.00, which represented an award for equitable division
of Plaintiff's net earnings from the date of separation to the date
of divorce and as attorney fees when Defendant had over $5,600.00
in attorney fees and over $1,000.00 in expert witness costs?
4.

Did the Trial Court err in allowing Plaintiff visitation

with the minor child from Wednesday through Sunday every other
week, when the child was only three (3) years old, was accustomed

3
to visiting with Plaintiff under a regular visitation schedule and
the Trial

Court

failed

to give specific

findings

to justify a

deviation from the standard visitation guidelines?

STATUTE, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(a) Grounds.
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or
part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided,
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct
the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury
or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of
discretion by which either party was prevented from having a
fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more
of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or
special verdict, or to a finding on any questions submitted to
them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the
affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could
not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party
making the application, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict
or other decision or that it is against law.
(7)

Error in law.

(b) Time for motion.
A motion for a new trial shall be
served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
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(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a
new trial is made undei Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it
shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial
is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The
opposing party has 10 days after such service within which to serve
opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an
additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for
good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation.
The
court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court.
Not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a new
trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on
motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds
therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter
or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after
entry of the judgment.

Rule 60(b) # Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered
evidence; fraud/ etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of
an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an
action has not been personally served upon the defendant as
required by Rule 4 (e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action;
(5) the judgment is void;
(6) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment
should have
prospective
application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1) , (2) , (3) , or (4) , not more
than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered
or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
This rule does
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.
The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
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Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)
Award of costs, attorney and witness fees - Temporary alimony.
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6,
and in any action to establish an order of custody, visitation,
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case,
the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to
enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action.
The
order may include provision for costs of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation,
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case,
the court may award costs and attorney fees upon determining that
the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. The
court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against
a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters in
the record the reason for not awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1) , the court may
order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the action,
for the separate support and maintenance of the other party and of
any children in the custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of the
action or in the final order or judgment.

Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code Annotated
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the
parties,
the
custody
of
the
children
and
their
support,
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the
property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from a denial of

Plaintiff's Motion to Amend or Alter the Judgment wherein Plaintiff
requested a calculation of child support based upon a Joint Custody
Worksheet

rather

than

upon

the

Sole

Custody

Worksheet.

The

Defendant responds to that appeal and also cross-appeals from the
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Decree of Divorce and the denial of Defendant's Rule 60(a) Motion,
and seeks alimony, a fair division of savings, attorney fees, and
reduction of visitation.
B.

Course of Proceedings,

married on July 27, 1987.

Plaintiff and Defendant were

One (1) child was born as issue of the

marriage and his name is JOSHUA J. UDY, born August

1, 1990.

Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint for divorce on September 21,
1992.

(R.O.A. 1-6).

A temporary order to show cause hearing was

held on October 8, 1992, with an Order dated October 22, 1992,
awarding Defendant primary custody of the minor child subject to
Plaintiff's visitation and also awarding Defendant

$150.00 per

month as child support to commence October, 1992 forward.

The

Court did not award temporary alimony or any attorney fees at that
time.

The Court did allow the father to have possession of the

family home. (R.O.A. 27-31).

Defendant objected to the Temporary

Order on Order to Show Cause regarding alimony, child support, and
attorney fees.

(R.O.A. 25-26).

On January 21, 1993, Plaintiff

filed for another Temporary Order on Order to Show Cause requesting
joint physical custody and Defendant filed a Counter Order to Show
Cause.

A hearing was held February 11, 1993, and the Court made

another Order on Order to Show Cause dated March 18, 1993, again
granting Defendant primary custody of the minor child, subject to
Plaintiff's visitation and allowed the parties to hire two (2)
separate

evaluators

to

complete

a

home

study

Plaintiff's request for joint custody was denied.

evaluation.

The Court then

ordered Plaintiff to pay $275.00 a month in child support. (R.O.A.

7
81-86) .

Plaintiff and Defendant both filed status reports on the

issues for trial. (R.O.A. 97 - 109). The final trial was held on
September 1, 1993, wherein the Court again awarded Defendant sole
custody

of

visitation.

the

minor

child

subject

to

Plaintiff's

expanded

The Court also ordered Plaintiff to pay $273.00 a

month in child support pursuant to the Sole Custody Worksheet, and
to

pay

Plaintiff

$1,500.00

which

represented

an

equitable

adjustment to the property award and a partial award of Defendant's
attorney

fees.

The Trial

Court

did not

award

Defendant

any

alimony. (R.O.A. Decree of Divorce 178 - 185). Defendant filed a
Rule 60(a) Motion to have the Court correct the $1,500.00 lump sum
payment because of the clerical error committed by the Court.
(R.O.A. 117 - 119) . On October 1, 1993, Plaintiff filed a Motion to
Base Child Support on a Joint Custody Worksheet.
both Defendant's and Plaintiff's Motions.

The Court denied

Plaintiff filed Notice

of Appeal regarding the Joint Custody Worksheet and Defendant filed
Notice

of

attorney

Cross-Appeal

regarding

fees and the excessive

alimony, division

of assets,

expansion of visitation.

On

February 7, 1994, the Appellate Court limited Plaintiff's appeal
solely to issues which fit
C.

under a Rule 60(b) Motion.

Disposition of the Trial Court.

As previously stated,

the Trial Court ruled on September 1, 1993, with Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law entered on November 5, 1993, with an amended
Decree entered on November 23, 1993.

The Defendant was awarded

sole custody of the minor child subject to Plaintiff's expanded
visitation rights.

Plaintiff was ordered to pay child support
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pursuant
Defendant

to the Sole
was awarded

Custody Worksheet

1.

$273.00 per month.

$1,500.00 as an equitable adjustment

property and attorney fees.
D.

of

on

Defendant was not awarded any alimony.

Statement of Facts.
Facts on Plaintiffs Rule 59/60 (b) Motion.

Plaintiff's

Motion to Base Child Support on a Joint Custody Worksheet claims to
be made under both Rule 59 and Rule 60. (R.O.A. 126-127) . However,
the Motion itself does not specify any grounds.

The Appellate

Court limited Plaintiff's appeal to only those issues in his motion
which could fit under Rule 60(b).
based

on judicial

Plaintiff's entire argument was

error and a request

judgment to conform with the law.
supporting affidavits.
Rule 59(a),

to amend or alter the

Plaintiff did not file any

Plaintiff's argument fits squarely within

(6) or (7) or 59(e) and as such it cannot also fit

under Rule 60. Attached is a copy of the Order denying Plaintiff's
Motion,

which

Order

incorporated

Defendant's

objections

to

Plaintiff's Motion as the findings (See Addendum " 1 " ) .
2.

Facts

on

Sole

Custody

Worksheet

for

Child

Support.

Plaintiff and Defendant had different work schedules in 1992 where
Plaintiff worked nights and Defendant worked days.

(R.O.A. 2 ) .

Plaintiff watched the minor child while Defendant was at work.
During a hearing on October 8, 1993 for temporary custody and
support, Defendant was awarded sole custody of the minor child, but
Plaintiff was allowed to watch the child while Defendant was at
work.

(R.O.A. 27-31).

The Court calculated the child

support

obligation at $150.00 per month primarily because Plaintiff was
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tending the minor child and providing two (2) meals each day for
the child.

This was not according to the standard child support

schedule and the Court gave no specific reasons in the minute entry
for deviating from the schedule. (R.O.A. 20) . However, in January,
1993, Plaintiff voluntarily changed his work schedule to days and
no longer provided daycare for the child.

(R.O.A. 47 and 66) .

The Court, on February 11, 1993, again awarded Defendant

sole

custody, but this time required Plaintiff to pay child support of
$275.00 per month based on a Sole Custody Worksheet, primarily
because

Plaintiff

(R.O.A. 83) .
Defendant's

was

no

longer

On September

Sole

Custody

providing

daycare

1, 1993, the Trial Court

Child

Support

evidence regarding child support.

Worksheet

services.
received

as the

sole

Plaintiff failed to submit a

calculation a joint physical custody worksheet on child support.
To the contrary, Plaintiff placed in his budget that he was paying
and would continue to pay $275.00 per month in child support.
(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit #2 attached as Addendum "2".)

Plaintiff

never objected to Defendant's Sole Custody Child Support Worksheet.
(R.O.A. 314). Plaintiff's counsel in closing argument stated his
client was prepared to pay child support on whatever amount the
Court deemed proper. (R.O.A. 327) . Plaintiff never proved at Court
that he contributed to extra expenses for the child above and
beyond child support.

Plaintiff only showed that he paid $13.00 a

month to a book club that existed prior to the divorce, that he
paid $250.00 for clothes each year and that he estimated paying
$300.00 in gifts for the child for a year.

(See Plaintiff's Trial
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Exhibit #2 attached as Addendum "2".)

Plaintiff indicated he had

paid some for food on the child, but that calculation started in
August,

1992, when he was feeding the child during the day.

Plaintiff attempted to create new evidence and retry the case on
page 22 and 23 of his Appellate Brief, claiming he is paying
additional expenses for the child. What the facts actually show is
Plaintiff was awarded standard visitation with really only one (1)
extra night of visitation every other week, that is Thursday of the
Plaintiff's weekend (under standard visitation Plaintiff gets every
Wednesday evening and every other Friday to Sunday already).

That

amounts to just 26 extra nights per year and for the extra 26
nights Plaintiff expects to reduce child support from $3,276.00 per
year (12 x $273.00) to $1,392.00 per year (12 x $116.00) , a savings
of over $1,884.00 for just 26 nights or $72.45 for each night.

The

Standard Visitation Schedule itself gives a visiting parent at
least 89 overnights with the child, which is twenty-five percent
(25%) of the overnights per year (see U.C.A. § 30-3-35, 2 nights
for 24 weekends = 4 8 , 26 nights for 4 weeks of summer visitation,
16 nights on holidays, particularly with Christmas, which may have
5 nights alone: total nights = 89 -s- 365 = 25%).
Moreover, either Custody Worksheet indicates that the total
support obligation to both parents is $477.00 per month or about
$16.00 per day (477 + 365 = 16) .
attached as Addendum "3".)

(See Defendant's Trial Exhibit #5

However, Plaintiff desires to change

the child support of $273.00 per month to less than $116.00 per
month (a net difference of $157.00 per month) based on only two (2)
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extra nights of visitation per month (i.e. two (2) Thursdays in the
month), which actually amounts to a reduction of $72.46 per day.
The reduction should be at most $8.00 a night (i.e. M of $16.00) to
be

fair.

The percentage

adjustments under the Joint

Custody

Worksheet tables do not fairly adjust support.
3.

Facts

approximately

on

$1,678.00

$1,174.60 per month.
#3).

Alimony.

Defendant's

and

her

wage

was

wage

was

approximately

(R.O.A. 312 and Defendant's Trial Exhibit

The Defendant's monthly budget was approximately $1,165.00

on the date of divorce, per month.
Thus,

net

gross

the

Defendant

had no

(Defendant's Trial Exhibit #3) .

extra

spendable

income

available.

(R.O.A. 306) .
The Plaintiff's gross income was approximately $2,765.00 per
month

and his net pay was approximately

(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit #1).

$1,867.00 per month.

The Plaintiff's budget submitted

to the Court was for $1,887.00 per month but this budget included
a gift fund of $79.17 per month, miscellaneous extra spending of
$173.33 per month, plus savings of $216.00 per month. (Plaintiff's
Trial Exhibit #2) . After subtracting these three (3) items off the
budget, Plaintiff

is really only spending $1,418.50 per month and

has a net spendable income of $448.50 per month compared to the
Defendant's inability to meet her basic needs.
Plaintiff

and

Defendant

separated

in

August,

1992

and

Defendant did not receive any temporary alimony from August, 1992
until the date of divorce and the Court did not award alimony in
the Divorce Decree.

(R.O.A. 183). This allowed the Plaintiff to
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receive more money during the date of separation than Defendant
received.
The Defendant calculated, using the gross income method, that
the Plaintiff should owe Defendant alimony of $496.00 per month
times at least 12 months for a total of $5,952.00.

(Defendant's

Trial Exhibit #6) . The Defendant also asked that alimony continue
for an appropriate length of time to allow Defendant to get on her
feet since she had to move out of the family home, set up her own
apartment, buy new furniture, spend all of her savings to pay Court
costs, attorney fees and bills (over $9,000.00) while Defendant was
able to keep at least $7,500.00 of his $9,000.00 savings in tact.
(R.O.A. 337 to 339).

The Court did not award Defendant

any

alimony.
4.

Facts on Division of Assets and Savings.

Defendant also

requested the Court to split whatever net income Plaintiff was able
to make in excess of the Defendant during the time of separation as
a marital asset. (R.O.A. 277) . The evidence showed that Plaintiff
had at least $7,500.00 left in savings and that Defendant had zero.
The Court ruled that since the Plaintiff had $1,867.00 per month
net income as opposed to the Defendant's net income of $1,3 97.00,
that there was a difference of $530.00 per month and that the
parties had been separated for nearly a year so that the Plaintiff
had available to him at least $6,360.00 (12 x $530.00) more than
the Defendant.

(R.O.A. 154).

The Court then offset Plaintiff's

pre-marital savings of $3,000.00 against this $6,360.00 difference
to come up with

$3,360.00.

(R.O.A. 155).

The Court failed to
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observe the evidence at trial which proved the pre-marital savings
had been commingled and was no longer a separate asset.

The Court

basically

Defendant

$1,500.00.

split

the

$3,360.00

50/50

and

awarded

The Court in its calculation, failed to consider that

Plaintiff had already been awarded one-half (1/2) or $1,500.00

of

his pre-marital savings when Plaintiff took the original $9,000.00.
The Court also ignored the fact that Plaintiff had $7,500.00 in
savings that should have been split 50/50 with Defendant on the
date of divorce.

(R.O.A. 278) . Accordingly, the Court should have

granted Defendant an equitable division of the property, $3,750.00
to the Defendant but instead only awarded $1,500.00.
5.

Facts

on Attorney

Fees.

Defendant

also

submitted

evidence regarding her attorney's fees incurred through the date of
trial totalling $5,643.00 with Court costs of $73.00, family study
fee of $950.00 and expert witness fee of $250.00.

(Defendant's

Trial Exhibit #4). Plaintiff testified that his fees were similar
and

that Defendant's

attorney

fees were

therefore

reasonable.

(R.O.A. 310). Defendant argued that the Plaintiff had more money
than the Defendant by at least $1,000.00 per month from gross wages
and

that he

should be required

to pay Defendant's

attorney's fees incurred in the case.

(R.O.A. 278).

reasonable
Defendant

demonstrated her need, in that her own income barely paid for her
monthly living expenses, and she had spent all of her $9,000.00
original savings while the Plaintiff, on the other hand, had the
ability to save $530.00 every month and still had over $7,500.00 of
his $9,000.00 original savings.

(R.O.A. 277). The Court awarded
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attorney's fees to the Defendant as part of the $1,500.00 equitable
property award.
6.

Facts on Extended Visitation.

Prior to divorce, the

Plaintiff worked swing shift from 4:00 p.m. to 1:30 a.m. every day
with the Defendant working day shift from 6:00 a.m. in the morning
until 3:30 p.m.

(R.O.A. 2 ) . Plaintiff often tended the child in

the day while Defendant was at work.

(R.O.A. 2) .

When the

divorce Complaint was filed in October of 1992, the Court granted
a temporary order awarding Defendant sole custody of the minor
child, subject to Plaintiff's right of visitation and ability to
tend the child when the Defendant was at work.

(R.O.A. 27-31).

In

January, 1993 the Plaintiff voluntarily switched his work schedule
to the day shift from 6:00 a.m. in the morning until 3:30 p.m.
(R.O.A. 47) . In February of 1993, the Court modified the temporary
order, granting

Defendant

sole

custody

subject

to

Plaintiff's

visitation rights basically as outlined in the new legislative
guidelines of U.C.A. § 30-3-35.

(R.O.A. 81-86) . The parties lived

by the statutory visitation guidelines from February, 1993 through
September, 1993. Two (2) expert witnesses conducted a family study
and proposed that the Defendant should be sole custodial parent
with the Plaintiff receiving expanded visitation.
At the trial Plaintiff

(R.O.A. 144).

sought joint custody and the Defendant

sought sole custody with regular visitation.

Judge Gordon J. Low

awarded sole custody of the minor child to Defendant, and granted
to the Plaintiff visitation pursuant to the statutory guidelines
but expanded the visitation so that the Plaintiff's visitation

15
would begin Wednesday after work rather than Friday after work
every other weekend. (R.O.A. 145-146).

Defendant contested this

award stating that it was too many days in a row for the minor
child to be separated from the natural mother and asked the Court
to either eliminate the Wednesday so that the visitation would
start on Thursday after work instead of Wednesday or permit the
Defendant to visit the child on Friday so that the child is not
absent from the mother for five (5) days straight.

(R.O.A. 302).

The Defendant is basically appealing the Court's decision to grant
extended visitation to the Plaintiff based on the parties' work
schedules, the prior historical visitation that the parties had
between one another up to the date of divorce and on the fact that
the minor child was too young to be away from his mother for five
(5) days out of seven (7) in one (1) week.

A younger child needs

more stability than an older child and this visitation schedule
creates too much instability.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate to the Appellate Court
that his Rule 59 and 60 Motion is anything but a Rule 59 Motion and
therefore

barred

Plaintiff has

on

appeal

for

untimely

notice

of

appeal.

attempted to argue that he is claiming judicial

error in the calculation of child support and that judicial error
fits under Rule 60(b)(1).

However, judicial error is properly

corrected with a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a) (6) or (7)
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or under a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) .
Plaintiff's appeal is therefore barred.
Even if Plaintiff could fit his motion under Rule 60(b)(1),
his request for a joint custody child support worksheet still fails
for several reasons.

Plaintiff was not awarded joint physical

custody, but merely expanded visitation of one
other week.

(1) night every

Plaintiff further failed to show he was contributing

significantly to the child's expenses above and beyond normal child
support, daycare and insurance and medical bills. Plaintiff failed
to submit evidence at the Trial Court requesting joint custody
child support, but instead, inserted sole custody child support
amounts in his budget and figures and told the Court he would abide
by any support ordered since his primary concern was visitation and
not money.
Defendant
marriage.

is

entitled

to

alimony

in

this

six

(6)

year

Plaintiff earns over $1,000.00 gross income per month

more than Defendant.

Plaintiff's net income per month exceeded

Defendant's by $530.00.

Plaintiff had the advantage, while still

married, to save net income of $6,360.00 in the twelve (12) month
separation time.
and

Plaintiff

Defendant had no savings on the date of divorce
had

over

$7,500.00

in

savings.

Defendant

demonstrated that she had to move out the family home, buy new
furniture

and

get

re-established

while

refinance his home to lower his payments.
over

Plaintiff

was

able

to

Defendant's budget was

$1,150.00 per month and her net take home pay was

only
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$1,167.00.

The Trial Court failed to specify the grounds in the

Findings for denial of alimony and the case should be remanded.
Defendant is entitled to an award of fifty percent (50%) of
the marital saving account on the date of divorce, which account
had $7,500.00 therein and Plaintiff is not entitled to any offset
for alleged pre-marital property since Plaintiff gifted this to
Defendant or commingled

it into the marital estate.

Even if

Plaintiff were to be given an offset, the Trial Court offset
$1,500 . 00 too much.
Defendant

is also entitled

to an award

for $5,600.00

in

attorney fees and $950.00 in family study costs and $250.00 in
expert

witness

fees.

The

Trial

Court

erroneously

included

Defendant's attorney fee award with the equitable property award
and failed to adequately compensate Defendant. Defendant also asks
for all attorney fees and costs of appeal should she prevail.
Defendant further requests that the Appellate Court remand the
Order regarding expanded visitation and order the Trial Court to
limit visitation to the standard schedule or to at least not more
than

from

Thursday

evening

to

Sunday

evening

on

Plaintiff's

weekend, giving Plaintiff an extra day every other weekend, where
the tenderness of the child's years and need for stability justify
such a result.

The Trial Court failed to make adequate findings to

support the expanded visitation and the law requires that this case
be remanded.
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DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL IS LIMITED BY ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 7,
1994 TO GROUNDS OR ISSUES UNDER RULE 60 OF UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND PLAINTIFF HAS NO SUCH GROUNDS.
Plaintiff's issues on appeal are limited to those which fit
under Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in Plaintiff's
Motion to the Trial Court.

However, Plaintiff's Motion to Base

Child Support on Joint Custody Worksheet dated October 1, 1993,
fits entirely under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Therefore none of Plaintiff's issues survived for appeal.
(a)

THE SUBSTANCE OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION WAS A RULE
59 MOTION AND IS BARRED ON APPEAL.

Plaintiff asked in his Rule 59 Motion that the Court change
its sole custody child support award to a joint custody child
support award.

Plaintiff used as grounds for the requested change

evidence that was previously supplied to the Trial Court.

Thus,

Plaintiff was asking the court to alter or amend its ruling based
on existing evidence.
The Plaintiff did not file an affidavit with his Rule 59
Motion so the Motion could not be one under Rule 59(a) (1) , (2) , (3)
or (4) since these require affidavits.

(See Rule 59(c).)

However,

Plaintiff's Motion clearly fits under Rule 59(a)(6) or
59(e).

(7) or

The Plaintiff admits in his Appellate Brief that he was

asking the Trial Court to change its decision since Plaintiff
thought it was against the law, which is Rule 59(a) (6) , or because
the judge made an error in applying the law, which is Rule 59(a) (7)
or 59(e).
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Plaintiff

admits

his argument

is one

of

judicial

error.

Plaintiff attempts to state that judicial error can be corrected
under Rule

(60(b) (1) for mistake.

However, judicial error is

corrected most commonly under Rule 59(a) (6) and (7) and 59(e) . The
substance of Plaintiff's argument is purely Rule 59 and substance
over style should govern, particularly where Plaintiff failed to
specify

in his Motion

the proper grounds.

Plaintiff's

motion

fits

erroneously

called

it

under
a

Rule

Rule
60

59

The

even

Motion

as

substance

of

though

Plaintiff

well.

Because

Plaintiff's arguments are entirely founded on categories covered by
Rule 59(a)(5), (6) or (7) as held by the Trial Court (See R.O.A.
204 and 139) or Rule 59(e) , his appeal should be dismissed pursuant
to the Appellate Court Order dated February 7, 1994.
(b)

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION DOES
CATEGORY IN RULE 60.
Plaintiff's

Motion

is

NOT
not

FIT UNDER
a

Rule

ANY

60(a)

motion

for

clerical mistake since Plaintiff claims judicial error.
"The distinction between judicial error and
clerical error does not depend upon who made
it. Rather it depends on whether it was made
in rendering the judgment (judicial error) or
in
recording
the
judgment
as
rendered
(clerical error). . . such an error (judicial
error) must be corrected by a timely motion
for a new trial (Rule 59) . by timely appealing
the matter, or by an independent action . . . "
Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah P.2d 314, 471
P.2d 143, 145 (Ut. 1970). (Emphasis added)
Plaintiff is claiming judicial error and not clerical
error and Rule 60(a) is not applicable.

Note that judicial

error is corrected by Rule 59 and not Rule 60 as Plaintiff
tries to argue.
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Nor does Plaintiff's Motion fall under Rule 60(b) (1) for
mistake as Plaintiff claims.
judicial error.

Plaintiff equates mistake with

However, the Court in Richards v. Siddoway,

held that judicial error is corrected by a timely motion for
a new trial which is Rule 59.

Id. at 145.

Again, substance

outweighs form and Plaintiff should not be allowed to avoid
the substance of Rule 59 by claiming Rule (60(b)(1) was the
form of his argument when Plaintiff failed to even state the
specific grounds in his Motion.
In addition, since Plaintiff failed to file an affidavit
in support of his Motion, Rule 59(c) would limit Plaintiff's
Motion to causes other than those found in Rule 59(a) (1) (2) (3)
or

(4) .

Plaintiff would likewise be barred from falling

within any category of Rule 60 (b) that correlates to Rule
59(a) (1) (2) (3) or (4) by that same logic.

Rule 60(b) (1) and

(2) correlate closely if not identically with Rule 59(a)(3)
and

(4)

(i.e. mistake

is the

same

thing

as accident

or

surprise) and Rule 60(b)(1) is not applicable in this case.
Of all the other categories from Rule 60(b)(2) through
(7),

only

Motion.

Rule

60(b)(7)

even

comes

close

to

Plaintiff's

However, for an action to fall under Rule 60(b)(7)

Plaintiff must not only show that none of the grounds from
Rule 60(b)(1) through (6) were applicable, but also that no
grounds under Rule 59 were applicable either.

See Laub v.

South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304 (Ut. 1982) (which
restricts subparagraph 60(b)(7) to claims that don't fit in
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the other subparagraphs of Rule 60(b)).

Plaintiff's Motion

does in fact fit under Rule 59 and, therefore, Rule 60(b)(7)
should not apply,
(c)

SUMMARY
As

a result of procedural

rules, Plaintiff

has

limited himself in the scope of his appeal to grounds
that only fit under Rule 60 (b) .
grounds.

Plaintiff's Motion in substance is a Rule 59

Motion and
Because

Plaintiff has no such

that

is how the Trial

Plaintiff's

Motion

fits

Court

treated it.

under

Rule

59,

Plaintiff's Motion is barred and should therefore be
dismissed on appeal in its entirety.

POINT II
EVEN IF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION COULD BE CATEGORIZED AS ONE
UNDER RULE 60, PLAINTIFF STILL CANNOT PREVAIL BECAUSE
PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROVE HE HAD "JOINT PHYSICAL" CUSTODY
OR THAT HE "CONTRIBUTED TO THE CHILD'S EXPENSES" IN
ADDITION TO PAYING CHILD SUPPORT.
Plaintiff failed to prove at trial that he was entitled to
have

child

support

calculated

pursuant

to

a

joint

custody

worksheet.
(a)

PLAINTIFF NEVER SUBMITTED EVIDENCE FOR OR
REQUESTED A JOINT CUSTODY WORKSHEET AT TRIAL,
BUT INSTEAD AGREED TO FOLLOW THE COURT'S ORDER
ON CHILD SUPPORT.
Plaintiff never submitted to the Trial Court any requests

that child support be calculated pursuant to a Joint Custody
Worksheet.

In fact, Plaintiff did not even submit a Joint

Custody Worksheet to the Court as an exhibit at trial.

22
To the contrary,

Plaintiff

accepted Defendant's

Sole

Custody Child Support Worksheet calculation as Defendant's
Exhibit

"5" and

told

the

court

in closing

argument

the

following:
"Mr. Thorne: I have no objections to [Defendant's
exhibit] one through five."
Transcript page 85
lines 9 and 10 (R.O.A. 314).
"Mr. Thorne: The other issues in this case I think
fall into place pretty well.
I think the court
will have to tell us on child support whether we
compute that on a joint custody arrangement or is
it sole custody. I think whatever it is, Mr. Udy
is prepared to work with it." (Emphasis added).
Transcript page 98 line 17 to 22 (R.O.A. 98).
Plaintiff was always trying to portray that he was more
concerned

about

having

time with his child

for the best

interest of the child regardless of the money side of things.
Plaintiff did not want to give the Trial Court the impression
he was seeking joint custody merely to reduce child support
and this testimony came through to the Trial Judge.

Plaintiff

even put in his budget, Plaintiff's Exhibit "2", that he was
paying $275.00 a month (a sole custody child support amount)
as child

support, so alimony and attorney

fees and debt

allocation could be reduced based on this higher child support
amount.

Plaintiff

should

not

be

allowed

to

change

his

position now.
(b)

PLAINTIFF WAS NOT AWARDED JOINT PHYSICAL
CUSTODY BUT ONLY "EXPANDED VISITATION".
The court never awarded Plaintiff joint physical custody

in any of the temporary orders or at trial.

The evidence was

clear and overwhelming at trial, both family study experts

23
agreeing, that sole custody to Defendant was the appropriate
award.

The Trial Court then awarded Plaintiff the standard

visitation but tweaked it a little and expanded visitation on
Plaintiff's

weekend

only.

This

expansion

did

not

give

Plaintiff joint physical custody, but just a little more time
after a full working day, to see the child on every other
Thursday night.

The Trial Court treated this as an expansion

to visitation, but really no different
purposes.

for child

support

As a result, Plaintiff's extra visitation time was

given to help the child and not to reduce support to the
child's detriment.
Plaintiff argues that he has the child at night more than
33%

of

the

time.

However,

even

in

standard

visitation

schedules, a father may have the minor child as much as 25% of
the nights.

That is why most states do not give a reduction

for joint custody unless the time with the child exceeds 3 0%
to 50%.

Utah is one of the only states with joint custody

reductions starting at 25%.
Plaintiff's Appellate Brief.)

(See Plaintiff's Exhibit F to
Most states give the Court

discretion on how to reduce the support in extended visitation
situations, usually by just 50% of the actual support paid for
those days.

Utah also gives noncustodial parents

a 50%

reduction in support when they have the child more than 25 out
of 3 0 consecutive days. Plaintiff, at most, received extended
visitation on every other Thursday and logically should only
receive the 50% reduction in support for the actual days
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visited, but only if they are consecutive and they were not in
this case.
(c)

PLAINTIFF NEVER ESTABLISHED EVIDENCE THAT
PLAINTIFF CONTRIBUTED TO THE CHILD'S NEEDS
BEYOND REGULAR CHILD SUPPORT.
Section 78-45-2(7) of U.C.A. (1953, as amended) provides

that:
"Joint physical custody means the child stays
with each parent overnight for more than 25%
of the year, and both parents contribute to
the expenses of the child in addition to
paying child support." (Emphasis added).
Plaintiff never introduced evidence or focused on whether
he was or would contribute to the expenses of the child in
addition to paying standard child support.

Plaintiff said he

would pay a book club membership of $13.00 per month, but this
existed prior to the divorce.

Plaintiff said he would buy

clothes and gifts for the child, but all fathers should do
that.

Plaintiff indicated he bought some meals for the child,

but again, all fathers buy food while exercising their weekend
visitation.

Plaintiff failed to show the Court he contributed

or would contribute to the child's expenses in a substantial
way above and beyond normal child support.

The Trial Court

found that Plaintiff failed to prove he was contributing to
the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support
(See R.O.A. 138 and 204).

If Plaintiff needed $1,887.00 per

month to support himself, then Defendant would need that and
more to support herself and the minor child as well.
Plaintiff's Exhibit

"2".)

(See

Defendant paid just as much as
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Plaintiff did for daycare, insurance, and uninsured medical
costs and a reduction in child support would have harmed
Defendant

and

the

child

much more

than

it

infringed

on

Plaintiff for the expense of just 26 extra Thursday nights a
year.
Both Sole and Joint Child Support Worksheets indicate a
total support obligation of $477.00 per month or $16.00 per
day.

To reduce Plaintiff's child support to either $116.00

per month or $53.00 per month as Plaintiff suggests (which is
at least $72.00 per day reduction) for just 2 extra nights of
visitation (i.e. Thursday night since Plaintiff and Defendant
share daycare on Thursdays), would punish Defendant and the
child unfairly.

If any reduction is due, it should only be

for 2 nights a month x $8.00 (since only 1/2 of day is used) .
Why should Plaintiff receive a reduction larger than what
those days are actually worth in total when this was treated
as expanded visitation and not joint physical custody?
The court, in its discretion, applied the appropriate
child support, after reviewing the factors and evidence that
a Sole Custody Child Support Worksheet was the applicable
guide for the court.

The Trial Court found, in rebutting the

presumption to use a joint custody worksheet, that the factors
of primary residence, alimony, child's needs, ability to pay
for extra items as well as other equities justified a sole
custody worksheet.

(See R.O.A. 139 and 204).
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CROSS APPEAL
POINT III
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO ALIMONY IN A SIX-YEAR MARRIAGE
WHERE PLAINTIFF'S INCOME IS $1,000.00 MORE PER MONTH THAN
DEFENDANT'S AND PLAINTIFF HAS AVAILABLE INCOME AND
DEFENDANT CAN BARELY MEET HER LIVING EXPENSES.
Temporary alimony is allowed under U. C. A. § 30-3-3(3) which
provides:
"(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1),
court may order a party to provide money, during
pendency of the action, for the separate support
maintenance of the other party and of any children in
custody of the other party."

the
the
and
the

Alimony is and has been awarded in short-term marriages to
temporarily equalize the parties' standard of living as closely as
possible or to assist the spouse to meet living expenses while she
is readjusting her affairs and life. See Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855
P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (5-year marriage awarded alimony of
$800.00 per month for 2 years.) The basic determination in all
alimony cases as stated in Rappleye at page 264 is:
"In awarding alimony, appellate courts require the trial
court to consider each of the following three factors:
(1) the financial condition and needs of the receiving
spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to
produce a sufficient income for him or herself; and (3)
the ability of the responding spouse to provide support.
If these three factors have been considered, we will not
disturb the trial court's alimony award unless such a
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear
abuse of discretion. Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 567
(Utah App. 1993) (quoting Schindler v. Schindler, 776
P.2d 84, 90 (Utah App. 1989)) (citation omitted.)
A denial of alimony is a clear abuse of discretion if the
record does not reveal that the court considered or made adequate
findings on the three factors regarding alimony.

See Canning v.
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Canning, 744 P. 2d 325, 326 (Ut. App. 1987) . The Court in Willev v.
Willev, 227 Utah Advance Rep 3 9 (Nov. 29, 1993) quoting Bell v.
Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 492 stated:
"Failure to consider the three [alimony] factors in
fashioning an alimony award constitutes an abuse of
discretion. 'Thus the trial court must make sufficiently
detailed findings on each factor to enable the receiving
court to ensure that the trial courts discretionary
determination was rationally based upon' the three
[alimony] factors."
In the present case, the Trial Court did not enumerate any
findings on Defendant's financial condition and needs or upon the
Plaintiff's financial condition and needs.

The only findings made

were on the parties' gross income and alleged net income.
The denial of alimony to Defendant creates a disparity in
annual incomes of the parties'. Plaintiff earns at least $1,000.00
gross income a month more than Defendant ($2,786.00 vs. $1,720.00).
Plaintiff's

alleged

budgeted

expenses

totaled

$1,887.37

but

included $216.67 for savings, $173.33 for unaccounted miscellaneous
spending, and $79.00 in gifts.
is

around

$1,418.50

Plaintiff's more realistic budget

per month when

Plaintiff's

alleged

Defendant's

alleged

net

income

budget

was

these

was
about

items

are

$1,867.00
$1,165.00

removed.

per

month.

per

month.

Defendant's alleged net income was about $1,174.6 0 according to
Defendant.
$448.00

per

Under these facts it is clear that Plaintiff has a
month

higher

standard

of

income

than

Defendant.

Defendant is caring for herself and the child on a smaller budget
than Plaintiff who is caring only for himself.

Defendant also was

forced due to separation, to buy new furniture and household items
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totalling $2,500.00 to $3,000.00.

Defendant also spent her entire

savings on separation of $9,000.00 by paying $5,600.00 attorney
fees,

$1,000.00

$3,000.00

for

to

Derek

furniture.

Mason
On

(family

the

other

study),
hand,

$2,500.00
Plaintiff

had

$9,000.00 in savings on separation and only spent $1,500.00 pending
the divorce with $7,500.00 of savings on the date of divorce.

This

disparity in standard of living justifies an award of alimony to
Defendant.

To equalize the standard of living and assist Defendant

in rehabilitation, the Plaintiff should have been ordered to pay
Defendant at least $300.00 per month in alimony for two years.

POINT IV
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AT LEAST FIFTY PERCENT (50%) OF
THE PARTIES' SAVINGS AS VALUED ON THE DATE OF DIVORCE.
The Trial Court awarded Defendant $1,500.00 in the form of
cash

from

savings

or potential

Defendant's attorney fees.

savings

by

Plaintiff

and

for

The evidence at trial showed that

Plaintiff and Defendant split $18,000.00 in savings upon separation
giving both $9,000.00. Plaintiff had at least $7,500.00 in savings
on the date of divorce and Defendant had zero.

Plaintiff also had

available in spendable income from August, 1992 to September, 1993
$530.00 more cash per month than Defendant, or $6,350.00 total.
The Trial Court, instead of dividing all of these savings 50/50,
offset $3,000.00 against Defendant's share of these savings using
the

theory

Plaintiff

had

$3,000.00

in

pre-marital

savings.

However, Plaintiff already had received $1,500.00 in pre-marital
savings when he took the $9,000.00 in savings upon separation.
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This was error for several reasons:
(1)

Property division in divorce should be valued on date of

divorce.
(2)

Plaintiff

had

gifted

and

commingled

his

pre-marital

savings and it should not be considered as a separate asset.
(3)

Plaintiff

already

was

awarded

one-half

(1/2)

of

the

marital savings account of $18,000.00 when he took $9,000.00 in the
temporary order and the Trial Court credited Plaintiff for the full
$3,000.00 as if Plaintiff had not already received one-half

(1/2)

of the $3,000.00 in savings.
(a)
The General rule is that the marital
valued at the time of the divorce decree.

estate

is

"As a general rule, the marital estate is valued at the time
of the divorce decree.

Moreover, any deviation from the general

rule must be supported by sufficiently detailed findings of fact
that explain the Trial Court's basis for such deviation."

Rappleye

v. Rappleve, 855 P.2d 260, 262 (Ut. App. 1993).
In Rappleye, the Court analyzed the value of a Merrill Lynch
cash account made on the date of separation

($58,456.00)

rather

than date of divorce ($2 0,244.00) . The court vacated the award and
remanded the case back to the Trial Court for reconsideration.
In the present case, the parties split a $18,000.00

savings

account on date of separation so each had $9,000.00 a piece.

On

the date of divorce, however, Plaintiff had $7,500.00 in savings
and Defendant had none.

Plaintiff made gross income of $1,000.00

per month more than Defendant and only paid Defendant $150.00 for
child support for four (4) months and $275.00 in child support for
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eight (8) months, or $2,800.00 total. Defendant had to use this on
the child's needs as well as spend her $9,000.00 savings fighting
the court battle and to establish a new residence.

The Trial Court

estimated that Plaintiff had $530.00 per month net income higher
than Defendant, or $6,360.00 per year, and that Plaintiff should
share part of this because of the disparity in savings and earnings
over the one (1) year separation period.

However, the findings do

not show why the Trial Court deviated from the general rule of
valuing

assets

on

the

date

of

divorce

and

not

the

date

of

separation.
Defendant should have received fifty percent
savings account as valued on the date of divorce
$7,500.00 = $3,750.00).

(50%) of the
(i. e. 50% of

Defendant should have also part of the

Plaintiff's net earnings over the one-year separation period as
alimony.

Defendant should have been awarded 50% of Plaintiff's net

earnings of $6,360.00 or another $3,180.00 as alimony, making
Defendant's total award $6,930.00 ($3,750.00 + $3,180.00) instead
of merely $1,500.00.
(b)

Plaintiff should not have received a $3/000.00
offset for his premarital savings since this was
gifted to Defendant and commingled in the marriage
and consumed.

There are clear guidelines on division of premarital property.
In Mortensen v. Mortensen 760 P.2d 308 (Utah 1988) the Court ruled.
"As a general rule, premarital property is considered
separate property and will be retained by the party who
brought it into the marriage unless: (1) the other spouse
has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property,
thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, Dubois
v.
Dubois,
supra,
or (2) the property has been consumed or
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its identify lost through commingling or exchanges or
where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest
therein to the other spouse." Id, at 308.
Regarding placing the spouses' name on a joint account, the
Court

stated

in part

that

it is no longer separate

if: "the

acquiring spouse places title in their joint names in such a manner
as to evidence an intent to make it marital property."

Jd. at 307.

In the present case, Plaintiff testified as follows regarding
his premarital assets: (Note Plaintiff claimed to have $2,800.00 in
checking; $3,000.00 in savings and had paid $1,133.00 down on a
house prior to marriage):
Checking:
Plaintiff: "No, I consider the $2,800.00 in checking to
be a gift to the marriage." Transcript page 14 line 8.9
(R.O.A. 243).
Savings
Mr. Grant: Your savings account, I'm assuming, prior to
the marriage had your name only on it, is that right?
Plaintiff:

Yes.

Mr. Grant: And after you married whose name showed up on
the account?
Plaintiff:

We put Becky's name on it.

Mr. Grant:

And the reason you put her name on it was why?

Plaintiff:
Umm, so that she would also be able to
withdraw some of the money that we placed into i t . . . .
Mr. Grant: Did she, as a signer and co-owner of that
account, have the right to withdraw those funds.
Plaintiff:

Yes, she did.

Mr. Grant: And she had control over them as well as you
had control over them?
Plaintiff:

Yes.
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Mr. Grant: And that was back in '87.
trace that $3,000.00 to today's date?

Are you able to

Plaintiff: Umm, not exactly, but I do know that we've
always had at least that much money in the account.
Mr. Grant: Money has gone in and out of that account for
five years, right?
Plaintiff:
Yes, but we've always maintained at least
that much in there.
Mr. Grant: You'd agree, wouldn't you, that Becky also
brought some valuable items into the marriage?
Plaintiff: Umm, yes. She brought a water bed, a cedar
chest. She claims all the wall decorations. A sewing
machine.
Mr. Grant:

A car?

Plaintiff:

Oh, yes, the car.

Mr. Grant: Those things are worth just as much as the
savings account, aren't they?
Plaintiff:

No, I don't believe so.

Transcript page 27 line 17-25; page 28 line 1-25; page 29 line 1-8.
(R.O.A.) 256, 257, 258) .
Home
Mr. Grant:
You would also admit that the home,
basically, was a marital home, purchased in contemplation
of marriage, wouldn't you?
Plaintiff:

Umm, I suppose so.

Transcript page 29 line 9-12.

(R.O.A. 258).

The home appraised for $43,000 and Plaintiff testified the debt on
the home upon date of divorce was below $40,000 so Plaintiff has
received over $3,000.00 in equity on the home already.
Mr. Grant:
The debt on the home at the time you
appraised it was forty-two nine. What is the debt now?
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Plaintiff: Umm, it is below $40,000, because I put money
down to refinance.
(Plaintiff had put $2,500.00 to
$3,000.00 down during the separation).
Transcript page 29, line 24-25; page 30 line 1-3.
259) .

(R.O.A. 258,

Defendant, on the other hand, testified on these same subjects as
follows:
Savings
Mr. Grant: Regarding this $3,0 00 that Brad wants back
out of his savings, did Brad gift that money to you when
he put it in your joint names?
Defendant:

I believe he did, yes.

Mr. Grant: Did he say something at that time about this
is our money now?
Defendant:

Yes.

Mr. Grant:

What did he say?

Defendant:
I just remember him saying we'll put your
name on the account and it will be our account from now
on. Then at that time we both started to put money in
it.
Transcript page 76 line 1-12 (R.O.A. 305).
Home
Mr. Grant: The family home was basically a marital home
ever since you were married, right?
Defendant:

Yeah.

Mr. Grant: And you believe that it's worth more than $43,000?
Defendant:

I do.

Mr. Grant:

Why?

Defendant:

Because the house values have gone up.

Transcript page 76 line 13-20 (R.O.A. 305).
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Accordingly, Plaintiff should not have received any credit for
the premarital assets since they were gifted to Defendant in joint
tenancy, or consumed and their identity lost when co-mingled into
marital assets.
premarital

Also, Defendant never received any credit for

assets she brought

into the marriage and

Plaintiff

received over $3,000.00 in equity in the family home that Defendant
never shared in.
(c) Even if Plaintiff was to receive a credit, the court
erroneously offset $1/500.00 too much.
The

Court

granted

Plaintiff

a

$3,000.00

offset

for

the

premarital items.

However, the court forgot that Plaintiff and

Defendant

the

divided

savings

50/50,

or

$9,000.00

each,

on

separation so that Plaintiff already received at least $1,500.00 of
his premarital savings.
The Court should have only credited the remaining $1,500.00
from the $7,500.00 savings and then awarded Defendant one-half
(1/2) of that.

Thus, $7,500.00 - $1,500.00 = $6,000.00 * 2 =

$3,000.00, which should have been awarded to Defendant instead of
just $1,500.

POINT V
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO HER ATTORNEY FEES AND EXPERT
WITNESS COSTS UNDER U. C. A. § 30-3-3
The findings show Plaintiff and Defendant incurred at least
$5,600 in attorney fees each and at least $1,000 each on expert
witness fees.
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The Trial Court, instead of explaining why Defendant was not
entitled to all of her attorney fees and costs, limited her award
to $1,500.00 as part of the property division and an equitable
award for attorney fees as discussed in part IV above.
Attorney fees and family study costs may be awarded in a
divorce trial under U. C. A. § 30-3-3(1) . "The award must be based
on evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the
requested fees.'1
1993) .

Willey v. Willey, 227 Ut. Adv. Rep. 3 9 at 43 (Ut.

As stated in Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 426 (Ut.

App. 1990):
"Furthermore,
'where the evidence
supporting
the
reasonableness of requested attorney fees is both
adequate and entirely undisputed, . . . the court abuses
its discretion in awarding less than the amount requested
unless
the reduction is warranted' by one or more of the
above factors. Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 518
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). The trial court must, accordingly,
identify such factors on the record and also explain its
sua sponte reduction in order to permit meaningful review
on appeal. "
In the present case, Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to the
reasonableness of the fees since each had incurred approximately
the same amount on a complicated custody case.

Defendant provided

evidence that she had spent all of her $9,000.00 savings on her
attorney fees, expert witnesses and moving costs to set up a new
house.
all

of

She also provided testimony that Plaintiff was able to save
his

$9,000.00,

except

perhaps

for

$1,500.00.

Thus,

Plaintiff had net earnings of $530.00 more a month than Defendant
but also saved $7,500.00 more in savings.

Defendant depleted her
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savings and was in financial need.

Plaintiff had the ability to

pay and even refinanced the home during separation, spending close
to $3,000.00.

An award should have been made which exceeded the

combined property/attorney
court.

fee award of $1,500.00 made by the

The Trial Court is required to show in the findings upon

what factors the Court relied or remand is appropriate.

See Willev

vi. Willey, page 44.
Also, Defendant is entitled to her attorney fees on appeal if
she prevails, where she was awarded attorney fees at trial (See
Burt v. Burt, 799 P. 2d 1166, 1171 (Ut. 1990)) and Willey Id. at
44.

As stated in Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P. 2d 421, 427 (Ut. App.

1990) :
"We may order either party to pay attorney fees under
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989), including attorney fees
incurred on appeal. Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P. 2d 713, 717
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057,
1061 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
However, before a court will award attorney fees, the
requesting party must show that: (1) he or she is in need
of financial assistance, and (2) the fees requested are
reasonable.
Bagshaw, 788 P. 2d at 1061.
Further, we
usually make such an award if the requesting party has
prevailed on at least some of the issues he or she has
raised on appeal, although under the language of Section
3 0-3-3, we are not absolutely prohibited from making an
award to a party who has not prevailed on appeal.
See
e.g.
Ostler, 789 P.2d at 717."
Defendant

has prevailed

on

appeal

and would

request

all

attorney fees on this appeal, which fees are attached as Addendum
»4 n
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POINT VI
VISITATION FOR CHILDREN UNDER AGE 5 SHOULD NOT BE
EXPANDED MORE THAN FOUR (4) DAYS AT A TIME SINCE THIS
CREATES INSTABILITY AND TOO MUCH CONFUSION WITH HIS
PRIMARY RESIDENCE.
Defendant was awarded sole custody subject to Plaintiff's
standard

statutory visitation schedule.

The Trial Court

then

awarded Plaintiff expanded visitation by giving Plaintiff an extra
night on Thursday (already entitled to evening on Wednesday) prior
to

Plaintiff's

normal weekend visitation.

received visitation for five

Plaintiff

(5) out of seven

actually

(7) days on the

weekend he has visitation.
Defendant argued that this was too much time from Defendant
who was the sole custodian and who provided the primary residence
and bed for the minor child for the past 9 months.

The child was

only three (3) years old.
The two (2) expert witnesses both agreed that younger children
need a more structured, stable environment than older children do.
(R.O.A. 333) .

They both testified that any expanded visitation

should be bunched together on Plaintiff's weekend and Derek Mason
thought that one (1) extra day of visitation was plenty of time.
Defendant testified that her minor child was only three (3)
years old and was accustomed to sleeping in his own bed and that he
had adjusted well to the temporary visitation order from January 1,
1993

to

schedule.

September

1,

1993, which

was

a

standard

visitation

Defendant testified that the minor child's life and

sense of who he was would be disrupted

too much

if expanded
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visitation were allowed.

Derek Mason concluded in his family study

report, page 7:
"I would recommend to the court that the current living
arrangement be maintained, that is, Becky remains the
primary residential parent. My recommendation is based
on two factors. First, Joshua has been living with his
mother and visiting his father long enough for this to
have become a familiar, secure routine. Changing this
structure may be difficult for him at this point in time.
Secondly, it is my assessment that Becky has a somewhat
better grasp of her son's needs and the parenting role
than Brad."
The Trial Court is required to make specific findings of fact
as to why expanded visitation was necessary when deviation from the
normal schedule occurs. As stated in the custody case of Barnes v.
Barnes, 857 P.2d 257 (Ut. App. 1993) at page 259:
"'However, to ensure the court acted within its broad
discretion, the facts and reasons for the court's
decision must be set forth fully in appropriate findings
and conclusions.'"
Sukin, 842 P.2d at 924 (quoting
Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988).
. . .If the findings are legally inadequate the exercise
of marshalling the evidence in support of the findings
becomes futile and the appellant is under no obligation
to marshal. Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah
App. 1991).
The Trial Court is required to make adequate findings
regarding the best interests of the child and past
conduct and demonstrated moral character of each of the
parents, Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah App.
1992) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (1) (1989) ) . It is
also required to consider which parent is most likely to
act in the child's best interest and to make findings
regarding that consideration. Id. (citing Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-10(2) (1989)).
Where applicable, the court may
also consider and make findings on other relevant
factors."
In this case, the Trial Court failed to make adequate findings
which would support expanded visitation and the case should be

39
remanded

for consideration

of the major

factors as stated

in

Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Ut. App. 1991) at page 433:
"We believe that the choice in competing child custody
claims should instead be based on
function-related
factors.
Prominent among these, though not exclusive, is
the identity of the primary
caretaker
during the
marriage. Other factors should include the identity of
the parent with greater flexibility to provide personal
care for the child and the identity of the parent with
whom the child has spent most of his or her time pending
custody determination if that period has been lengthy.
Another important factor should be the stability of the
environment provided by each parent."
Defendant desires a more limited expansion of visitation, from
Thursday to Sunday every other week rather than from Wednesday to
Sunday every other week to create a more stable environment for the
child.

CONCLUSION
Based on the arguments above, Defendant requests that the
Plaintiff's Appeal be dismissed since it does not fit under the
issues of Rule 60(b), and that the no alimony award be vacated and
remanded to the Trial Court for further findings, and that she
actually be awarded temporary alimony of at least $300.00 per month
for two (2) years; that Defendant be awarded one-half

{%) of the

savings account as it appeared on the date of divorce which is onehalf (M) of at least $7,500.00, that Defendant be awarded one-half
(H) of the net earnings Plaintiff made between August 1992 and
August 1993, which would be one-half {%) of at least $6,360.00 or
$3,180.00; that Defendant be awarded $5,600.00 in attorney fees and
$950.00 plus $250.00

in expert

fees and her attorney

fees of
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$4,500.00 and costs of $384.00 for a total of $4,884.00 on this
Appeal, and that Plaintiff's expanded visitation be limited to
Thursday night to Sunday night every other weekend instead of from
Wednesday to Sunday of every weekend or remanded to the Trial Court
for further consideration. Adequate findings were not submitted to
justify

no

reduction

alimony,

of

the

attorney

expanded visitation.

inadequate

fees

and

division

expert

of

witness

savings,
fees,

and

the
the

To deny Defendant's claim in each of these

areas was an abuse of discretion.

DATED this

5

day of July, 1994.
OLSON Sc HOGGAN, P.C.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and exact copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to Plaintiff's attorney, Jeff R.
Thorne, MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE, at 98 North Main, P.O. Box 876,
Brigham City, Utah

843 02, and eight (8) true and correct copies to

the Utah Court of Appeals, at 230 South 500 East, #400, Salt Lake
City, UT

84102, this

day of July, 1994.

^7?U,
Marlin J/ Gran
udy.brf/mjg/div
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Marlin J. Grant (#4581)
OLSON St HOGGAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
88 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
Telephone (801) 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
BRADLEY J. UDY,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs,
REBECCA UDY,
Civil No, 924000268
Defendant.

Plaintiff

filed

a

motion

to

have

the

Court

reconsider,

pursuant to Rule 59 and Rule 60, Plaintiff's request to base child
support

upon

a

joint

custody

worksheet.

objection.

The

Court

has

review

Defendant's

objections

and

arguments

Defendant

the arguments
cited

filed

an

and based

on

therein

orders

as

follows:
1.

Plaintiff's motion is denied.

2.

Child support will be as ordered in the Decree of Divorce,

based on a sole custody worksheet for the reasons set forth in
Defendant's response.
}•>

DATED this

V

day of December, 1993.

—-Judge Gordon J. Low
District Court Judge

ON & HOGGAN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
8 8 WEST CENTER

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

P.O. BOX 525
JAN. UTAH 8 4 3 2 3 - 0 5 2 5
(SOD 752-1551
=?EMONTON OFFICE:
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P.O. BOX 115
IMONTON. UTAH 84337
(801)257-3885
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Marlin J. Grant (#4581)
OLSON 8c HOGGAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
123 East Main
P.O. Box 115
Tremonton, Utah 84337
Telephone (801) 257-3885
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
BRADLEY J. UDY,
OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
JOINT CUSTODY SUPPORT WORKSHEET

Plaintiff,
vs,
REBECCA RUDD UDY,

Civil No. 92400268DA
Defendant,

Plaintiff/Husband filed for a Rule 60 and Rule 59 Motion to
Change the Child Support from a sole custody worksheet to a joint
custody worksheet.
Defendant/Wife objects to this Motion for these reasons:
1.

Plaintiff/Husband does not state under what theory the

Court should change the support (i.e. clerical error, accident or
surprise,

newly

discovered

evidence,

error

in law, mistake,

excusable neglect, fraud, etc.). Defendant/Wife cannot imagine any
subsection

of

Rule

60

or

59

justifiably make their argument.
•N 8c HOGGAN, P.C.
TTORNEYS AT LAW
8 8 WEST CENTER
P.O. BOX 5 2 5

that

Plaintiff/Husband

could

Their argument is in fact a

request to have the Judge merely reconsider and make their old
argument.
2.

Plaintiff/Husband in fact advanced the theory that the

>N. UTAH 8 4 3 2 3 - 0 5 2 5
(801) 752-1551

Court should use a joint custody worksheet (see Plaintiff's Status

EMONTON OFFICE:

Report, page 3, item 3, dated June 1, 1993); (Plaintiff's Complaint

1 2 3 EAST MAIN
P.O. BOX 1 1 5

asking

for joint

custody);

(Plaintiff's Orders

RONTON. UTAH 84337

to Show

Cause

^pqot3o3(*&-

(801)257-3885

i$

requesting joint custody support calculations).

Plaintiff/Husband

has had his day in court and his chance to prove up why joint
custody child support should be ordered.
judicata.
3.

This matter

is res

There needs to be an end to a court order.
Defendant/Wife was in fact awarded sole custody in the

Order to Show Cause hearing held on October 8, 1992 and February
11, 1993.

Defendant/Wife was also awarded sole custody in the

divorce on September 1, 1993.

The Court had every right to follow

the sole custody child support schedule in those instances and
rightly did so.
4.

Only in cases of "joint physical custody" is a joint

physical custody support worksheet used.
physical

custody

to Defendant/Wife

The court awarded sole

and the standard

statutory

visitation guidelines, but with some expanded visitation.
5.

"Joint physical custody" is defined as "the child stays

with each parent over night for more than twenty-five percent (25%)
of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the
child in addition to paying child support".

U.C.A. §78-45-2(7)

Plaintiff/Husband had his chance to prove he is paying the expenses
of the child in addition to just paying child support and the Court
did not make any finding that Plaintiff /Husband paid extra support.
The Court basically found that Defendant/Wife was paying for the
child's expenses and ordered Plaintiff/Husband to pay sole custody
child

support.

guidelines.

This

was

totally

Plaintiff/Husband

in

cannot

line

with

re-argue

the

his

support

case

just

because he failed to prove that he was contributing to the child's
expenses. The truth is Defendant/Wife pays all costs for clothing,
housing, and other basic needs for the child.

Plaintiff/Husband

N & HOGGAN. P.C.
TTORNEYS AT LAW

spends for the child's needs just like every other father who has

B8 WEST CENTER
P.O. BOX 5 2 5
N. UTAH 8 4 3 2 3 - 0 5 2 5
(801)752-1551

visitation.
6.

Defendant/Wife was not granted any alimony and she can

barely support herself and the child

on $273.00 per month in child

IMONTON OFFICE:
1 2 3 EAST MAIN

support. Defendant/Wife spends in fact more than $273.00 per month

P O . BOX 1 1 5
IONTON, UTAH 8 4 3 3 7
(801)257-3885

J5«

on the child.
It would be an abuse of justice to reduce the '
support even more.
7.
his

Plaintiff/Husband has not filed an Affidavit to support I

motion,

therefore,

Rule

59(c)

would

Plaintiff/Husband's Motion to Rule 59(a) 5, 6 or 7.

restrict j
The only

possible item Plaintiff/Husband could advance would be an error at
law .since the damages are not excessive and the evidence was
clearly present when the Court made the decision so it was not
insufficient.

The Court has the discretion, in awarding support,

to take factors into account such as primary residence, alimony,
child's needs, ability to pay for extra items (see U.C.A. §30-3-5;
§78-45-7).

If the guidelines are rebutted, the Court can look at

all the factors in §78-45-7(3).

The Court certainly considered

these factors as well as other equities in awarding child support
as it did.

The award cannot therefore be challenged merely on an

error in application of the law.
8.

Rule 60(b) requires a showing of grounds, time lines,

plus the fact the Plaintiff /Husband would succeed on the merits of
his case.

Plaintiff/Husband had a chance to argue his merits

already and did not succeed.

His Motion is really just a request

for reconsideration which is not allowed under the Rules. Drurv v.
Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662 (Ut. 1966).
CONCLUSION

Defendant/Wife requests the Court to deny Plaintiff/Husband ' s
Motion on the grounds it is not specific, fails to state proper
grounds for the Motion, is unsupported by affidavit; is just a
request for reconsideration and not proper under the rules, is
si & HOGGAN, P.C.

unsupported by the facts and the Court has already decided upon

TORNEYS AT LAW
8 WEST CENTER
P.O. BOX 525
I. UTAH 84323-0525
SOI) 752-1551
MONTON OFFICE
123 EAST MAIN
P O . BOX 1 15
5NTON. UTAH 84337
301) 257-3885

Plaintiff/Husband's requests for joint support, denied the same and
it is res judicata.

Plaintiff/Husband's proper remedy is an appeal

if he is not satisfied with the Court's first ruling.
Defendant/Wife requests her attorney fees to defend against
this Motion in the sum of $300.00.

fl

DATED this

/ 2-

day of October, 1993.
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

Marlin J. Gsant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the
foregoing Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Joint Custody Support
Worksheet to Plaintiff's attorney, Jeff Thorne of MANN, HADFIELD &
THORNE, at 98 North Main, P. 0. Box 876, Brigham City, Utah 84302,
this

/ Z - day of October, 1993.

JU-\

Marl in J." Grar^f

udy.obj/mjg/div

I & HOGGAN, P.C.
ORNEYS AT LAW
J WEST CENTER
P O. BOX 525
, UTAH 84323-OS25
MD1) 752-1551

lONTON OFFICE23 EAST MAIN
».0. BOX 1 1 5
NTON. UTAH 84337
© 1)257-3885

^o

ADDENDUM

"2"

BUDGET

Mountain Fuel
Utah Power & Light
Tremonton City
Insight Cable
GTE Telephone
Life Insurance
House Payment
Kidsland Daycare
Child Support
Food for Josh and Brad
Clothes - Brad
Clothes - Josh
Josh's Book Club
Automotive Expenses
Gift Fund
Misc. Spending Money
Emergency Fund - Savings
Doctor/Dentist/Medication

$

44.95

17.78
30.82
38.35
28.49
30.00
461.50
118.44
275.00
148.01
33.33
20.83
13.00
113.88
79.17
173.33
216.67
43.82
$1,887.37

k PLAlNTlFF£

f EXHIBIT* # &

iWz<ffiz%&

Explaination of Monthly Budget

1992
Mt. Fuel
Ut Power
City
GTE
Cable
Life Ins

Aug

Sept

Oct

Nov

Dec

1993
Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

,12.89
25.13
42.55
27.32
38.35
30.00

19.49
11.32
29.75
30.02
38.35
30.00

38.88
16.92
29.75
32.18
38.35
30.00

81.67
17.66
29.75
27.21
38.35
30.00

95.29
22.07
29.75
26.00
38.35
30.00

88.83
18.50
29.75
28.91
38.35
30.00

79.45
13.41
29.75
32.99
38.35
30.00

47.34
17.14
29.75
29.04
38.35
30.00

35.04
16.24
29.75
27.18
38.35
30.00

15.32
14.90
29.75
28. 18
38.35
30.00

House payment
Kidsland Daycare
Child Support
Food-Josh & Brad
Clothes - Brad
Clothes - Josh
Josh's Book Club
Auto Expenses
Gift Fund
Misc. Spending
Savings
Medical

$213. 00 bi-weekly $213 x 26 = $5,538. 00 =
From 1--1-93 'thru 6-30i-93, I paid a total of

June

July

13 . 64
22. 00
29. 75
29. 66
38. 35
30. 00

11.53
18.04
29.75
23 . 17
38.35
30.00

Month
Ave.
44.95
17.78
30.82
28.49
38.35
30.00

ci
$

710.64

From 8--1-92 thru 8-1-•93, I spent a total of
$1,776. 12
From 8--1-92 •thru 8-1-•93, I spent approximately $400. 00
From 8--1-92 thru 8-1-•93, I spent approximately $250. 00

f

6

- 12
* 12
f 12

=
=
=
=
ss

Insurance $594.60, Gas $450, Service $80,
License $121.96, Inspection, $20, Repair $100 = $1,366.56 f 12
Xmas,B-Day,M/F Day immediate family = $200, Josh $300,
Brad $200, Grandparents $120, Nieces & Nephews $90,
Friends, misc. $40, = $950.00
f 12 =
Dining out, work breaks, recreation, misc. $40 per week
x 52 - $2080
Josh's college, unexpected expenses, truck downpayment, vacation,
future investments, emergency fund-maintain 6 months wages in
case of lost employment @ $50.00 per week x 52 - $2,600
f 12 =
From 8-1-92 thru 8-1-93, I spent approximately $525.84
f 12 =

461.50
118.44
275.00
148.01
33.33
20.83
13.00

113.8*

12

=

79. 17
173 . 33
216.67
43 .82
$1,877.17

ADDENDUM
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Marlin J. Grant (#4581)
OLSON St HOGGAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
88 West Center
P. 0. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
Telephone: 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
REBECCA RUDD UDY,

)

Plaintiff,

'

)
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION
)
WORKSHEET
) (Sole Custody and Paternity)

vs.
Civil No.

BRADLEY J. UDY,
Defendant.
BASE AWARD CALCULATION

N & HOGGAN. P C
TTORNEVS AT LAW

IS WEST CENTER
P O BOX 525
M. UTAH 84323 0525
(SOU 752 1551

]1.
|
{
|2a.
}
|
J2b.
|
|
|2c.
]
|
j
|2d.
|
j
|3.
j
|
|4.
j
|
i
J 5.
|
j
|6.
|
!
j7.
]
!

1
Mother ! Father ! Combined j
Enter the combined number of natural //////////I//////////I
!
and adopted children of this mother
//////////I//////////I
i
!
and father.
//////////!//////////!
!
Enter the father's and mother's gross
monthly income. Refer to Instructions
$1,678.00 !$2,786.00 ! 1II111111777!
for definition of income.
Enter previously ordered alimony that
i ////////////!
is actually paid. (Do not enter
////////////!
alimony ordered for this case.)
$ —
////////////!
$ -- '
Enter previously ordered child sup////////////!
port. (Do not enter obligations
////////////!
ordered for the children in this
////////////!
case.)
$ —
$ -////////////!
Optional: Enter the amount from Line
////////////i
12 of the Children in Present Home
Worksheet for either parent.
$ -$ —
mi i ii ii ii i\
Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from
2a. This is the Adjusted Monthly
Gross for child support purposes.
$1,678.00 $2,786.00 $4,464.00 i
Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3
////////// //////////
and the number of children in Line 1 ////////// //////////
to the Support Table. Find the Base ////////// //////////
i
Combined Support Obliqation.
////////// lllllll111
$459.00
!
Divide each parent's adjusted monthly
I!UIIIIIIII\
gross in Line 3 by the COMBINED
llllllllllll\
adjusted monthly aross in Line 3.
! .375%
.625%
11111111111l\
Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each
IIHIIUIIII\
parent to obtain each parent's share
IIIIIIIIIIII\
of the Base Support Obliqation.
! $172.00
! $287.00
IIIIIIIIIIII\
Enter the child(ren)'s portion of
xiiiiiiiuiin
monthly medical and dental insurance
\IIIIIIIIIIII\
premiums paid to insurance company. U 2 0,00
[$20.00
\iiiiiniiiii\

MONTON OFFICE
123 EAST MAIN

P O BOX 1 1 5
ONTON UTAH 84337
(801) 257 3885

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT WJ

I! NO6

*/?/)

Enter the monthly work or training
related child care expense for the
children in Line 1.
9.

[7777777777 UIIIIIIII\
] ////////// / / / / / / / / / / i
\ l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 //////////IS 225.00

BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD
Bring down the amount in Line 6 for the Obligor
Parent.

j
j
!$287.00

j
j
!

j
!$ 267.00
j
!$ 267.00

|
j
j
',

12. CHILD CARE AWARD
j
Multiply Line 8 by .50 to obtain obligor's share ofj
child care expense. Add to Line 10 only when
J
expense is actually incurred.
. |$_112.50

j
j
j
|

10. Adjusted Base Child Support Award
Subtract the Obliqor's Line 7 from Line 9.
11. Adjusted Base Child Support Award per Child
Divide Line 10 by Line 1.

& HOGGAN, P.C.
DRNEYS AT LAW
WEST CENTER
.O. BOX 525
UTAH 84323-0525
31)752-1551
ONTON OFFICE:
*3 EAST MAIN
O BOX 1 15
ITON. UTAH 84337
> 1)257-3885

ADDENDUM
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BECKY UDY
T-5386
Attornev# s Fees/Appeal
December 6, 1993
Letter on Appeal and other matters.

$ 23.75

December 16, 1993
Drafting Order, Findings and Cross Appeal.

$ 95.00

December 30, 1993
Letter to Court on Appeal and review of Appeal.

$ 47.50

January 6, 1994
Review of court
DeAnn.

file

and

telephone

conference

with
$ 23.75

January 13, 1994
Review of Appeal by Jeff Thorne and office visit.

$ 95.00

January 14, 19 94
Drafting Statement and related appeal items.

$285.00

January 18, 19 94
Review of appellate letter, phone call to clerk, drafting
Docketing Statement.
$ 47.50
January 20, 1994
Drafting
Memorandum
Statement.

and

finalizing

Docketing
$190.00

January 21, 1994
Papers of appeal.

$ 47.50

January 27, 1994
Appellate matters.

$ 47.50

February 16, 19 94
Answer of appeal matters.

$ 23.75

February 17, 1994
Research on appeal.

$ 71.25

February 23, 1994
Review of Trial Transcript and Arguments for Appeal. $ 95.00
February 24, 1994
Drafting Summary of Argument.

$142.50

BECKY UDY
T-5386
Attornev/s Fees/Appeal
February 25, 19 94
Drafting Appellate Argument on Child Support.

$380.00

March 2, 1994
Drafting Appellate Brief and research.

$190.00

March 3, 1994
Research appeal.

$190.00

March 8, 1994
Drafting Cross Appeal.

$380.00

March 10, 1994
Drafting Brief on Appeal.

$ 95.00

April 28, 1994
Drafting of Appellate Argument.

$ 95.00

May 9, 1994
Review of Brad's Brief.

$190.00

May 19, 1994
Review of law and research of Brief.

$142.50

May 31, 1994
Research and drafting Arguments.

$142.50

June 1, 1994
Phone call.

$142.50

June 2, 1994
Work on appeal.

$ 4 7.50

June 3, 1994
Drafting Brief.

$380.00

June 9f 1994
Drafting Appeal Brief.

$ 95.00

June 16, 1994
Drafting Appeal.

$190.00

June 23, 1994
Drafting Appeal.

$285.00

BECKY UDY
T-5386
Attorney7 s Fees/Appeal
June 30, 1994
Drafting and finalizing Appeal.

$285.00

Estimated time for Hearing and review of Jeff
Thorne Reply.

$950.00

TOTAL

$5,415.00
Total hours spent on appeal were 57 and were billed at
$95.0 0 per hour.

DISCOUNT GIVEN

<$915.00>

TOTAL

$4,500.00

Costs Advanced/Appeal
February 4, 1994
Costs advanced to District Court for copies.
February 4, 1994
Costs advanced
deposit.

to

Rodney

Felshaw

for

$119.50
Transcript
$ 50.00

February 16, 1994
Costs advanced to Rodney Felshaw for Transcript.

$214.50

TOTAL

$3 8 4 . 0 0

TOTAL

$4,884.00

